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How can a developing country attract foreign direct investment (FDI)? This question has 
long been the subject of debate among policy-makers in developing economies who regard 
FDI as an important catalyst for economic growth. As the global economy has become 
increasingly interdependent, multinational enterprises (MNEs) form multilateral production 
networks, where production processes are subdivided into several stages and some 
developing countries have successfully participated in certain parts of these networks. The 
purpose of this paper is to explore the factors and policies that may help to bring FDI into a 
developing country. 
     While research on the activities of MNEs has been conducted widely since the late 
1980s, a limited number of studies has comprehensively handled every operational pattern 
of MNEs in one model. Especially, the export-platform is not much discussed in the 
theoretical studies, even though its importance has been revealed by the empirical side. 
Because a low-cost developing country may play an important role as an export-platform, 
an analytical model for this study must include this type in addition to the typical 
horizontal- and vertical-type MNEs. 
     One of the most sophisticated studies that considers typical types of MNEs including 
export-platforms in the same analytical framework was presented by Ekholm, Forslid, and 
Markusen (2007). Using a numerical simulation model, in which two market countries and 
one exogenously given developing country are considered, they explored the conditions 
under four types of firm strategy while gradually changing two types of costs, one for 
trading components and the other for assembling components. However, their model has 
only one factor of production, and the non-market country is just assumed to set exogenous 
factor pricing in a partial equilibrium framework. Another work that nests every type of 
MNE in one model is presented by Ito (2012). Extending the two-region, four-country (two 
countries in each region) model developed by Navaretti and Venebles (2004) to include 
export-platform, he showed that a reduction in trade costs, either inter-regional or 
intra-regional, induces firms to choose export-platform rather than other types. To enable 
the theoretical model to yield testable hypotheses for empirical testing, he incorporated only 
trade costs abstracting production costs away. 
     A good candidate for the base of an analytical model that includes both trade and 
production costs in a general equilibrium setting is the knowledge-capital model developed 
by Markusen (1997) and further extended by Zhang and Markusen (1999). Although 
export-platform is not taken into account, the computational model is able to verify effects 
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of changes in firm-type on factor prices in the countries where the MNEs are active. As 
employment and labor wages in the host country are important factors MNEs use to decide 
on a production strategy, this feature based on the general equilibrium nature of the 
knowledge-capital model is essential for our study. Thus, we utilized an extended version of 
the model for this study. 
     The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 illustrates the structure 
and main assumptions of the analytical model. Section 3 explains how the model is 
parameterized as a numerical model. In Section 4, we perform simulations and report on the 
results that reveal conditions for which each type of firms would be active in a given 
economic environment with a special focus on the effects of trade liberalization and 
optional cost-saving policies. Finally, Section 5 presents the conclusions of this paper. 
 
 
2. The Extended Knowledge-Capital Model 
 
The model used in this study is a simple extension of the knowledge-capital model that was 
used as the workhorse in Markusen (2002), including national enterprises (NEs), horizontal 
MNEs (HMNEs), vertical MNEs (VMNEs), and export-platform MNEs (EMNEs). The 
model is also extended to include two developing countries, in which the final assembly 
process of multinational production may take place while the finished products are not sold 
locally but exported, which is in addition to the original assumption of two developed 
countries in which MNEs are established and there are markets for the commodity 
produced by those MNEs. 
     An important point here is that we do not limit the volumes of those developing 
countries, which always stay small in terms of factor endowments. Because the 
knowledge-capital model is a general equilibrium model, branching out and setting up 
subsidiaries by MNEs in a developing country affects the local factor prices. If the host 
country is relatively small, factor prices appreciate more than they would in a relatively 
large country. This may substantially frustrate the incentive of the MNE to stay in the 
country and trigger it to find another place where cheaper production factors are available. 
     With this model, we investigate which production pattern is adopted by firms 
established in two countries out of four to sell Product in both home and foreign (target) 






There are four countries ܣ, ܤ, ܥ, and ܦ, indexed as ݎ. ܣ and ܤ are assumed to be 
countries in which MNEs are established and there are markets for the commodity 
produced by those MNEs. We index these countries ݅ or ݆ as a subset of ݎ. ܥ and ܦ 
are countries in which the final assembly process of multinational productions may take 
place while the finished products are not sold locally but exported. The index of these 
countries is ݓ, another subset of ݎ. 
     There are three types of goods, ܺ, ܻ, and ܼ. The intermediate good (a component) 
ܺ is used to produce the final product ܻ by the MNE. This sector exhibits increasing 
returns to scale (IRTS) so that the market is assumed to be imperfectly competitive. ܺ is 
produced only in the home of the MNE, country ݅, and is sent to country ݎ where the final 
assembly process takes place. The finished product ܻ is sold on the target market ݆. Note 
that all MNEs in each production type, national ܰ, horizontal ܪ, export-platform ܧ, and 
vertical ܸ, indexed as ݍ, share identical technologies and productivities. On the other hand, 
ܼ is a regular product based on a constant-returns-to-scale (CRTS) technology so that the 
market is perfectly competitive. ܼ is produced in every country ݎ, and is sold on the 
international market as a perfect substitute. 
     Production factors are of two types, ܭ and ܮ, which are immobile among national 
boundaries. Although we mainly regard ܭ as skilled labor (human capital) in this study, it 
can be further extended to include the status of institutions (rules and regulations) and/or 
the business environment. ܮ is unskilled labor. The national endowments of these factors 
are set exogenously in the model. In the experimental simulations, we change the relative 
factor endowments for either the developed- or developing-country groups given absolute 
levels of total endowments for the groups. 
     In the IRTS sector, two types of fixed cost, ܨ and ܩ, are required to start operating 
a firm. Whereas ܩ, measured in units of unskilled labor ܮ, is needed to set up an assembly 
plant in country ݎ (country specific), ܨ, measured in units of skilled labor ܭ, is required 
to establish a firm and its local subsidiary in a foreign country (firm-type/trade-link 
specific). 
     There are also trade costs for international transport of ܺ and ܻ, which are specific 
to each trade link. We assume that unskilled labor ܮ in the exporting country is used for 
this. On the other hand, it is assumed for simplicity that shipping ܼ does not generate any 
cost. 
 




There are two groups of firms producing ܻ, one is established and headquartered in 
country ܣ and the other in ܤ (country ݅). The markets for ܻ are limited to countries ܣ 
and ܤ  (country ݆ ). Good ܻ  is produced in two stages with IRTS technology by 
imperfectly competitive firms. In the first stage, each firm produces its components 
(intermediate good) ܺ only in its home country using skilled labor ܭ. In the second stage, 
a firm may send its components to a foreign subsidiary and finalize the production of ܻ 
there, assembling components ܺ using locally hired unskilled labor ܮ. This assembly 
process can take place in any country ݎ. If the assembly is taking place in a developing 
country ݓ, all of the final products are exported to one or both of the developed countries 
݆. If it is performed in the home country ݅, the products are sold domestically or exported to 
a foreign market ݆. If it takes place in a foreign market country ݅, the products are only 
sold locally. In addition, if a firm has only one plant in a market country ݅, it must be 
located in the home country.  
     There are both firm-level and plant-level scale economies. By free entry and exit of 
firms in each operational pattern, a production regime, which refers to a combination of 
firm types in an equilibrium, is determined. Following Ekholm, Forslid, and Markusen 
(2007), regimes will be denoted by suffices with letters, the first letter referring to a firm’s 
home country ݅, the second one referring to the destination market ݆, and the third one 
referring to the location of its assembly plant (݅ or ݓ). When it is possible to omit some of 
those letters without creating any confusion, the length of the suffix becomes shorter. The 
regimes are categorized into four types, ܰ, ܪ, ܧ, and ܸ, which express the production 
pattern of a firm. The four production-types are defined as follows. 
 
Type-N: NEs that maintain a single plant with headquarters in country ݅. This type of firms 
produces both components ܺ  and final products ܻ  in country ݅ . A fraction of the 
products ܻ may or may not be exported to country ݆. 
 
Type-H: HMNEs that maintain plants in both market countries, with headquarters in 
country ݅. This type of firms produces components ܺ in country ݅, some of which are 
shipped to an assembly plant in country ݆. The final products ܻ are produced in both 
market countries. No fraction of product ܻ may be exported. 
 
Type-E: EMNEs that maintain a plant in one of the developing countries ݓ, in addition to 
a plant and headquarters in home country ݅. This type of firms produces components ܺ in 
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country ݅, some of which are shipped to an assembly plant in country ݓ. All of the final 
products ܻ produced in country ݓ are exported to the foreign market in country ݆, while 
the ones produced in the home country are sold domestically. 
 
Type-V: VMNEs that maintain a single plant in one of the developing countries ݓ, with 
headquarters in country ݅. This type of firm produces components ܺ in country ݅, which 
are then shipped to the assembly plant in country ݓ. All of the final products ܻ are 
exported to both of the markets in developed countries ݆. 
 
     Figure 1 shows schematic images of these four types of production patterns. In each 






Figure 1: Four Types of Production Patterns 
 
 
2.2.1 Type-N Firm Established in Country ࢏ 
 
A type-N firm produces three types of products: components ௜ܺே; final products for the 
domestic market ௜ܻ௝ሺ௜ୀ௝ሻே ; and final products for the foreign market ௜ܻ௝ሺ௜ஷ௝ሻே . The skilled 
labor requirements to produce one unit of a component in home country ݅  can be 
expressed as: 
 ܭ௜ே ൌ ߠ௄ ௜ܺே ൅ ܨ௜ே,      (1) 
where 
 ܭ௜ே is the skilled labor input hired in country ݅; 
 ௜ܺே is the quantity of components produced; 
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 ܨ௜ே is the fixed cost to establish a NE in country ݅; and 
 ߠ௄ is the unit input requirement for skilled labor. 
Similarly, the requirements for both unskilled labor and components to produce one unit of 
final product in home country ݅ can be expressed as: 
 ܮ௜ே ൌ ߠ௅ ∑ ௜ܻ௝ே௝ ൅ ൫߬௜௝௒ ௜ܻ௝ே൯ሺ௜ஷ௝ሻ ൅ ܩ௜;    (2) 
and 
 ௜ܺே ൌ ߠ௑ ∑ ௜ܻ௝ே௝ ,       (3) 
where 
 ܮ௜ே is the unskilled labor hired in country ݅; 
 ௜ܻ௝ே is the quantity of final products; 
 ܩ௜ is the fixed cost to set up an assembly plant in country ݅; 
 ߠ௅ is the unit input requirement for unskilled labor; 
 ߠ௑ is the unit input requirement for components; and 
 ߬௜௝ሺ௜ஷ௝ሻ௒  is the rate of trade cost for the international shipping of final products. 
Then, the cost function for a type-N firm is given by: 
 ݌௜௄ܭ௜ே ൅ ݌௜௅ܮ௜ே 
 ൌ ൛ሺ݌௜௄ߠ௄ߠ௑ ൅ ݌௜௅ߠ௅ሻ ௜ܻ௝ேൟሺ௜ୀ௝ሻ ൅ ൣ൛݌௜௄ߠ௄ߠ௑ ൅ ݌௜௅൫ߠ௅ ൅ ߬௜௝௒ ൯ ௜ܻ௝ேൟ൧ሺ௜ஷ௝ሻ 
   ൅ሺ݌௜௄ܨ௜ே ൅ ݌௜௅ܩ௜ሻ,      (4) 
where 
 ݌௜௄ is the price of skilled labor; and  
 ݌௜௅ is the price of unskilled labor. 
The first term on the right-hand side of Equation (4) corresponds to the variable cost with 
respect to ௜ܻ௝ሺ௜ୀ௝ሻே . Similarly, the second term corresponds to the one with respect to 
௜ܻ௝ሺ௜ஷ௝ሻே . The last term corresponds to the total fixed cost. 
 
2.2.2 Type-H Firm Established in Country ࢏ 
 
A type-H firm produces four types of products: components ௜ܺ௝ሺ௜ୀ௝ሻு ; components ௜ܺ௝ሺ௜ஷ௝ሻு ; 
final products for the domestic market ௜ܻ௝ሺ௜ୀ௝ሻு ; and final products for the foreign market 
௜ܻ௝ሺ௜ஷ௝ሻு . The skilled labor requirements to produce one unit of components in the home 
country ݅ can be expressed as: 




 ܭ௜௜ு is the skilled labor input hired in country ݅; 
 ௜ܺ௝ு is the quantity of components produced; and 
 ܨ௜௜ு is the fixed cost to establish a HMNE in country ݅. 
To ship components ௜ܺ௝ሺ௜ஷ௝ሻு  from country ݅ to destination ݆, the following amount of 
unskilled labor must be hired in country ݅: 
 ܮ௜௜ு் ൌ ൫߬௜௝௑ ௜ܺ௝ு൯ሺ௜ஷ௝ሻ,      (6) 
where 
 ܮ௜௜ு் is the unskilled labor hired for international shipping; and  
 ߬௜௝ሺ௜ஷ௝ሻ௑  is the rate of trade cost for the international shipping of components. 
Next, the requirements for both unskilled labor and components to produce one unit of final 
products in home country ݅ can be expressed as: 
 ܮ௜௜ு௉ ൌ ߠ௅ ௜ܻ௜ு ൅ ܩ௜;      (7) 
and 
 ௜ܺ௜ு ൌ ߠ௑ ௜ܻ௜ு,       (8) 
where 
 ܮ௜௜ு௉ is the unskilled labor input hired in country ݅; and 
 ௜ܻ௜ு is the quantity of final products assembled in country ݅. 
Similarly, the requirements for both unskilled labor and components to produce one unit of 
final products in foreign country ݆ are: 
 ܮ௜௝ሺ௜ஷ௝ሻு௉ ൌ ߠ௅ ௜ܻ௝ሺ௜ஷ௝ሻு ൅ ܩ௝;     (9) 
and 
 ௜ܺ௝ሺ௜ஷ௝ሻு ൌ ߠ௑ ௜ܻ௝ሺ௜ஷ௝ሻு ,      (10) 
where 
 ܮ௜௝ு௉ is the unskilled labor input hired in country ݆; 
 ௜ܻ௝ு is the quantity of final products assembled in country ݆; and 
 ܩ௝ is the fixed cost to set up an assembly plant in country ݆. 
At the local subsidiary in foreign country ݆, skilled labor is needed to train unskilled labor 
how to handle the intermediate: 
 ܭ௜௝ሺ௜ஷ௝ሻு ൌ ܨ௜௝ሺ௜ஷ௝ሻு ,      (11) 
where 
 ܭ௜௝ሺ௜ஷ௝ሻு  is the skilled labor input hired in country ݆; and 
 ܨ௜௝ሺ௜ஷ௝ሻு  is the fixed cost to set up an assembly plant in country ݅. 
Then, the cost function for a type-H firm is given by: 
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 ݌௜௄ܭ௜௜ு ൅ ݌௜௅ሺܮ௜௜ு௉ ൅ ܮ௜௜ு்ሻ ൅ ൫݌௝௄ܭ௜௝ு൯ሺ௜ஷ௝ሻ ൅ ൫݌௝௅ܮ௜௝ு௉൯ሺ௜ஷ௝ሻ 
 ൌ ൛ሺ݌௜௄ߠ௄ߠ௑ ൅ ݌௜௅ߠ௅ሻ ௜ܻ௝ுൟሺ௜ୀ௝ሻ ൅ ൣ൛൫݌௜௄ߠ௄ ൅ ݌௜௅߬௜௝௑൯ߠ௑ ൅ ݌௝௅ߠ௅ൟ ௜ܻ௝ு൧ሺ௜ஷ௝ሻ 
   ൅∑ ൫݌௝௄ܨ௜௝ு ൅ ݌௝௅ܩ௝൯௝ .      (12) 
As in the case of the type-N firm, the first term on the right-hand side of Equation (12) 
corresponds to the variable cost with respect to ௜ܻ௝ሺ௜ୀ௝ሻு . The second term corresponds to 
the one with respect to ௜ܻ௝ሺ௜ஷ௝ሻு . The third term is the total fixed cost. 
 
2.2.3 Type-E Firm Established in Country ࢏ 
 
A type-E firm produces four types of products: components ௜ܺ௝ሺ௜ୀ௝ሻா ; components ௜ܺ௪ா ; 
final products for the domestic market ௜ܻா஽; and final products for the foreign market 
௜ܻ௝௪ሺ௜ஷ௝ሻாி . The skilled labor requirements to produce one unit of a component in home 
country ݅ can be expressed as: 
 ܭ௜௜ா ൌ ߠ௄ሺ ௜ܺ௜ா ൅ ௜ܺ௪ா ሻ ൅ ܨ௜௜ா,     (13) 
where 
 ܭ௜௜ா is the skilled labor input hired in country ݅; 
 ௜ܺ௜ா is the quantity of components produced for the domestic plant; 
 ௜ܺ௪ா  is the quantity of components produced for the plant in country ݓ; and 
 ܨ௜௜ா is the fixed cost to establish a EMNE in country ݅. 
To ship components ௜ܺ௪ா  from country ݅  to a developing country ݓ , the following 
amount of unskilled labor must be hired in country ݅: 
 ܮ௜ா் ൌ ߬௜௪௑ ௜ܺ௪ா ,       (13) 
where 
 ܮ௜ா் is the unskilled labor hired for international shipping; and  
 ߬௜௪௑  is the rate of trade cost for the international shipping of components. 
The requirements for both unskilled labor and components to produce one unit of final 
products in home country ݅ can be expressed as: 
 ܮ௜௜ா௉ ൌ ߠ௅ ௜ܻா஽ ൅ ܩ௜;      (15) 
and 
 ௜ܺ௜ா ൌ ߠ௑ ௜ܻா஽,       (16) 
where 
 ܮ௜௜ா௉ is the unskilled labor input hired in country ݅; and 
 ௜ܻா஽ is the quantity of final products assembled in country ݅. 
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Similarly, the requirements for both unskilled labor and components to produce one unit of 
final products in developing country ݓ are: 
 ܮ௜௪ா௉ ൌ ൛൫ߠ௅ ൅ ௝߬௪௒ ൯ ௜ܻ௝௪ாிൟሺ௜ஷ௝ሻ ൅ ܩ௪;    (17) 
and 
 ௜ܺ௪ா ൌ ߠ௑ ௜ܻ௝௪ሺ௜ஷ௝ሻாி ,      (18) 
where 
 ܮ௜௪ா௉ is the unskilled labor input hired in country ݓ; 
 ௜ܻ௝௪ሺ௜ஷ௝ሻாி  is the quantity of final products assembled in country ݓ for country ݆;  
 ܩ௪ is the fixed cost to set up an assembly plant in country ݓ; and 
 ௝߬௪௒  is the rate of trade cost for the international shipping of final products. 
Similarly to the case of the type-H firm, skilled labor is needed at the local subsidiary to 
train unskilled labor how to handle the intermediate: 
 ܭ௜௪ா ൌ ܨ௜௪ா ,       (19) 
where 
 ܭ௜௪ா  is the skilled labor input hired in country ݓ; and 
 ܨ௜௪ா  is the fixed cost to set up an assembly plant in country ݓ. 
Then, the cost function for a type-E firm is given by: 
 ݌௜௄ܭ௜௜ா ൅ ݌௜௅ሺܮ௜௜ா௉ ൅ ܮ௜௜ா்ሻ ൅ ݌௪௄ܭ௜௪ா ൅ ݌௪௅ ܮ௜௪ா௉ 
 ൌ ሺ݌௜௄ߠ௄ߠ௑ ൅ ݌௜௅ߠ௅ሻ ௜ܻா஽ ൅ ൣ൛ሺ݌௜௄ߠ௄ ൅ ݌௜௅߬௜௪௑ ሻߠ௑ ൅ ݌௪௅ ൫ߠ௅ ൅ ௝߬௪௒ ൯ൟ ௜ܻ௝௪ாி൧ሺ௜ஷ௝ሻ 
   ൅ሺ݌௜௄ܨ௜௜ா ൅ ݌௜௅ܩ௜ ൅ ݌௪௄ܨ௜௪ா ൅ ݌௪௅ ܩ௪ሻ.    (20) 
Note that ௜ܻ௝௪ሺ௜ୀ௝ሻாி ൌ 0 and ܨ௜௝ሺ௜ஷ௝ሻா ൌ 0. The correspondence between the expressions 
on the right-hand side of Equation (18) and the variable or fixed cost is the same as before. 
 
2.2.4 Type-V Firm Established in Country ࢏ 
 
A type-V firm produces two types of products: components ௜ܺ௪௏ ; and final products for 
markets in developed countries ௜ܻ௝௪௏ . The skilled labor requirements to produce one unit of 
a component in home country ݅ can be expressed as: 
 ܭ௜௜௏ ൌ ߠ௄ ௜ܺ௪௏ ൅ ܨ௜௜௏,      (21) 
where 
 ܭ௜௜௏ is the skilled labor input hired in country ݅; 
 ௜ܺ௪௏  is the quantity of components produced for the plant in country ݓ; and 
 ܨ௜௜௏ is the fixed cost to establish a VMNE in country ݅. 
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To ship components ௜ܺ௪௏  from country ݅  to a developing country ݓ , the following 
amount of unskilled labor must be hired in country ݅: 
 ܮ௜௜௏ ൌ ߬௜௪௑ ௜ܺ௪௏ ,       (22) 
where 
 ܮ௜௜௏  is the unskilled labor hired for international shipping; and  
 ߬௜௪௏  is the rate of trade cost for the international shipping of components. 
The requirements for both unskilled labor and components to produce one unit of final 
product in country ݓ can be expressed as: 
 ܮ௜௪௏ ൌ ߠ௅ ∑ ௜ܻ௝௪௏௝ ൅ ∑ ௝߬௪௒ ௜ܻ௝௪௏௝ ൅ ܩ௪;    (23) 
and 
 ௜ܺ௪௏ ൌ ߠ௑ ∑ ௜ܻ௝௪௏௝ ,      (24) 
where 
 ܮ௜௪௏  is the unskilled labor input hired in country ݓ; and 
 ௜ܻ௝௪௏  is the quantity of final products assembled in country ݓ for country ݆. 
As in the previous cases, skilled labor is needed at the local subsidiary to train unskilled 
labor how to handle the intermediate: 
 ܭ௜௪௏ ൌ ܨ௜௪௏ ,       (25) 
where 
 ܭ௜௪௏  is the skilled labor input hired in country ݓ; and 
 ܨ௜௪௏  is the fixed cost to set up an assembly plant in country ݓ. 
Then, the cost function for a type-E firm is given by: 
 ݌௜௄ܭ௜௜௏ ൅ ݌௜௅ܮ௜௜௏ ൅ ݌௪௄ܭ௜௪௏ ൅ ݌௪௅ ܮ௜௪௏  
 ൌ ൛ሺ݌௜௄ߠ௄ ൅ ݌௜௅߬௜௪௑ ሻߠ௑ ൅ ݌௪௅ ൫ߠ௅ ൅ ௝߬௪௒ ൯ൟ ௜ܻ௝௪௏ ൅ ሺ݌௜௄ܨ௜௜௏ ൅ ݌௪௄ܨ௜௪௏ ൅ ݌௪௅ ܩ௪ሻ. 
         (26) 
Note that ܨ௜௝ሺ௜ஷ௝ሻ௏ ൌ 0. The first term on the right-hand side of Equation (26) corresponds 
to the variable cost with respect to ௜ܻ௝௪௏ , and the second term is the total fixed cost. 
 
2.2.5 Production Volume of a Firm 
 
In an equilibrium, the production volume of a firm in its respective type of production 
pattern is determined by a pricing relation that assures marginal revenue does not exceed 
marginal cost. The pricing relations for every type of production pattern can be expressed 
as: 
 ݌௝௒൫1 െ ߪ௜௝ே൯ ൑ ݌௜௄ߠ௄ߠ௑ ൅ ݌௜௅൫ߠ௅ ൅ ߬௜௝ሺ௜ஷ௝ሻ௒ ൯  ٣ ௜ܻ௝ே; (27) 
 ݌௝௒൫1 െ ߪ௜௝ு൯ ൑ ൫݌௜௄ߠ௄ ൅ ݌௜௅߬௜௝ሺ௜ஷ௝ሻ௑ ൯ߠ௑ ൅ ݌௝௅ߠ௅  ٣ ௜ܻ௝ு; (28) 
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 ݌௝௒ሺ1 െ ߪ௜ா஽ሻ ൑ ݌௜௄ߠ௄ߠ௑ ൅ ݌௜௅ߠ௅    ٣ ௜ܻா஽; (29) 
 ݌௝௒൫1 െ ߪ௜௝௪ாி ൯ ൑ ሺ݌௜௄ߠ௄ ൅ ݌௜௅߬௜௪௑ ሻߠ௑ ൅ ݌௪௅ ൫ߠ௅ ൅ ௝߬௪௒ ൯ ٣ ௜ܻ௝௪ாி ; (30) 
and 
 ݌௝௒൫1 െ ߪ௜௝௪௏ ൯ ൑ ሺ݌௜௄ߠ௄ ൅ ݌௜௅߬௜௪௑ ሻߠ௑ ൅ ݌௪௅ ൫ߠ௅ ൅ ௝߬௪௒ ൯ ٣ ௜ܻ௝௪௏ , (31) 
where 
 ݌௝௒ is the price of good ܻ;  and 
 ߪ௜௝௪௤  is the proportional markup of price over marginal cost (ݍ ൌ ܰ,ܪ, ܧ, ܸ). 
The perpendicular symbol “٣” shows the complementary slackness relationships between 
inequalities and endogenous variables. When a relation holds with equality, the 
corresponding variable takes a positive value. 
     The optimal markup in a Cournot model with homogeneous products is defined by 
the firm’s share divided by the Marshallian price elasticity of demand in the market. 
Because the Marshallian elasticity of demand is െ1  in the present model with 




,      (32) 
where 
 ܭഥ௝ is an exogenously given level of skilled labor endowment for country ݆; 
 ܮത௝ is an exogenously given level of unskilled labor endowment for country ݆; and 
 ߚ௝ is the share of type-Y goods in the representative consumer’s utility function. 
Applying (32) to Relations (27) through (31) gives the following: 
 ௜ܻ௝ே ൒ ߚ௝൫݌௝௄ܭഥ௝ ൅ ݌௝௅ܮത௝൯ ቊ௣ೕ
ೊି௣೔಼ ఏ಼ఏ೉ି௣೔ಽቀఏಽାఛ೔ೕሺ೔ಯೕሻೊ ቁ
ቀ௣ೕೊቁ
మ ቋ  ٣ ௜ܻ௝ே; (33) 
 ௜ܻ௝ு ൒ ߚ௝൫݌௝௄ܭഥ௝ ൅ ݌௝௅ܮത௝൯ ቊ௣ೕ
ೊିቀ௣೔಼ ఏ಼ା௣೔ಽఛ೔ೕሺ೔ಯೕሻ೉ ቁఏ೉ି௣ೕಽఏಽ
ቀ௣ೕೊቁ
మ ቋ ٣ ௜ܻ௝ு; (34) 
 ௜ܻா஽ ൒ ߚ௝൫݌௝௄ܭഥ௝ ൅ ݌௝௅ܮത௝൯ ቊ௣ೕ
ೊି௣೔಼ ఏ಼ఏ೉ି௣೔ಽఏಽ
ቀ௣ೕೊቁ
మ ቋ  ٣ ௜ܻா஽; (35) 
 ௜ܻ௝௪ாி ൒ ߚ௝൫݌௝௄ܭഥ௝ ൅ ݌௝௅ܮത௝൯ ቊ௣ೕ
ೊି൫௣೔಼ ఏ಼ା௣೔ಽఛ೔೉ೢ ൯ఏ೉ି௣ಽೢ ቀఏಽାఛೕೊೢ ቁ
ቀ௣ೕೊቁ
మ ቋ ٣ ௜ܻ௝௪ாி ; (36) 
and 
 ௜ܻ௝௪௏ ൒ ߚ௝൫݌௝௄ܭഥ௝ ൅ ݌௝௅ܮത௝൯ ቊ௣ೕ
ೊି൫௣೔಼ ఏ಼ା௣೔ಽఛ೔೉ೢ ൯ఏ೉ି௣ಽೢ ቀఏಽାఛೕೊೢ ቁ
ቀ௣ೕೊቁ
మ ቋ ٣ ௜ܻ௝௪௏ . (37) 
 




Similarly to the production volume of a firm, number of firms in each type of production 
pattern is determined by a zero profit condition that assures markup revenue does not 
exceed fixed cost payment. The zero profit conditions for every type of production pattern 
can be expressed as: 
 ∑ ߪ௜௝ே݌௝௒ ௜ܻ௝ே௝ ൑ ݌௜௄ܨ௜ே ൅ ݌௜௅ܩ௜    ٣ ܯ௜ே; (38) 
 ∑ ߪ௜௝ு݌௝௒ ௜ܻ௝ு௝ ൑ ∑ ൫݌௝௄ܨ௜௝ு ൅ ݌௝௅ܩ௝൯௝     ٣ ܯ௜ு; (39) 
 ߪ௜ா஽݌௜௒ ௜ܻா஽ ൅ ∑ ൫ߪ௜௝௪ாி ݌௝௒ ௜ܻ௝௪ாி൯ሺ௜ஷ௝ሻ௝ ൑ ݌௜௄ܨ௜௜ா ൅ ݌௜௅ܩ௜ ൅ ݌௪௄ܨ௜௪ா ൅ ݌௪௅ ܩ௪  
        ٣ ܯ௜௪ா ; (40) 
and 
 ∑ ߪ௜௝௪௏ ݌௝௒ ௜ܻ௝௪௏௝ ൑ ݌௜௄ܨ௜௜௏ ൅ ݌௪௄ܨ௜௪௏ ൅ ݌௪௅ ܩ௪   ٣ ܯ௜௪௏ , (41) 
where 
 ܯ௜ே is the number of type-N firms established in country	݅; 
 ܯ௜ு is the number of type-H firms established in country	݅; 
 ܯ௜௪ா  is the number of type-E firms established in country	݅ that have plants in ݓ; 
 ܯ௜௪௏  is the number of type-V firms established in country	݅ that have plants in ݓ; 
 ௜ܻ௝௪ሺ௜ୀ௝ሻாி ൌ 0; 
 ܨ௜௝ሺ௜ஷ௝ሻா ൌ 0; and 
 ܨ௜௝ሺ௜ஷ௝ሻ௏ ൌ 0. 
Using Relations (27) through (31), (38) through (41) can be rewritten to: 
 ∑ ൣ൛݌௝௒ െ ݌௜௄ߠ௄ߠ௑ െ ݌௜௅൫ߠ௅ ൅ ߬௜௝ሺ௜ஷ௝ሻ௒ ൯ൟ ௜ܻ௝ே൧௝ ൑ ݌௜௄ܨ௜ே ൅ ݌௜௅ܩ௜ 
        ٣ ܯ௜ே; (42) 
 ∑ ൣ൛݌௝௒ െ ൫݌௜௄ߠ௄ ൅ ݌௜௅߬௜௝ሺ௜ஷ௝ሻ௑ ൯ߠ௑ െ ݌௝௅ߠ௅ൟ ௜ܻ௝ு൧௝ ൑ ∑ ൫݌௝௄ܨ௜௝ு ൅ ݌௝௅ܩ௝൯௝  
        ٣ ܯ௜ு; (43) 
 ൫݌௝௒ െ ݌௜௄ߠ௄ߠ௑ െ ݌௜௅ߠ௅൯ ௜ܻா஽ 
 ൅∑ ൣ൛݌௝௒ െ ሺ݌௜௄ߠ௄ ൅ ݌௜௅߬௜௪௑ ሻߠ௑ െ ݌௪௅ ൫ߠ௅ ൅ ௝߬௪ሺ௜ஷ௝ሻ௒ ൯ൟ ௜ܻ௝௪ாி൧௝  
 ൑ ݌௜௄ܨ௜௜ா ൅ ݌௜௅ܩ௜ ൅ ݌௪௄ܨ௜௪ா ൅ ݌௪௅ ܩ௪    ٣ ܯ௜௪ா ; (44) 
and 
 ∑ ൣ൛݌௝௒ െ ሺ݌௜௄ߠ௄ ൅ ݌௜௅߬௜௪௑ ሻߠ௑ െ ݌௪௅ ൫ߠ௅ ൅ ௝߬௪௒ ൯ൟ ௜ܻ௝௪௏ ൧௝  
 ൑ ݌௜௄ܨ௜௜௏ ൅ ݌௪௄ܨ௜௪௏ ൅ ݌௪௅ ܩ௪    ٣ ܯ௜௪௏ . (45) 
     To summarize the type-Y good sector in the model, the output levels and number of 
firms categorized in the four types of production patterns are respectively determined by 
Inequalities (33) through (37) and (42) through (45), given the factor and commodity prices 




2.3 Type-Z Good Producer 
 
A Type-Z good is produced in every country ݎ with skilled and unskilled labor using a 
Cobb-Douglas CRTS technology under perfect competition. The production function is: 
 ܼ௥ ൌ ߛ௥ሺܭ௥௓ሻఈೝሺܮ௥௓ሻଵିఈೝ,      (46) 
where 
 ܼ௥ is the output volume of type-ܼ good in country ݎ; 
 ܭ௥௓ is the skilled labor input; 
 ܮ௥௓ is the unskilled labor input; 
 ߙ௥ is the share of skilled labor; and 
 ߛ௥ is a scaling factor of measuring units. 
The producer in every country ݎ chooses the levels of ܼ௥, ܭ௥௓, and ܮ௥௓, to maximize 
profit subject to (46) given the prices of skilled and unskilled labor, ݌௥௄ and ݌௥௅, and the 
output ݌௓. The first order conditions (FOCs) for the optimum are given by: 
 ݌௥௄ ൌ ߙ௥݌௓ ቀ௓ೝ௄ೝೋቁ ,      (47) 
and  
 ݌௥௅ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߙ௥ሻ݌௓ ቀ௓ೝ௅ೝೋቁ.      (48) 




The representative consumer in every country ݎ maximizes her/his utility subject to their 
budget constraints given the price of commodities. 
 
2.4.1 Consumer in Country ࢏ 
 
The welfare level of a representative consumer in a developed (market) country ݅ is 
assumed to be given by the following Cobb-Douglas utility function: 
 ௜ܷ ൌ ߜ௜൫ ௜ܻ௎൯ఉ೔൫ܼ௜௎൯ଵିఉ೔ ,     (49) 
where 
 ௜ܷ is the welfare level of the representative consumer in country ݅; 
 ௜ܻ௎ is the consumption level of type-Y goods produced in the IRTS sector; 
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 ܼ௜௎ is the consumption level of type-Z goods produced in the CRTS sector; 
 ߚ௜ is the share of type-Y goods (mentioned in Subsection 2.2.5); and 
 ߜ௜ is a scaling factor. 
The budget constraint for the consumer is expressed as: 
 ݌௜௒ ௜ܻ௎ ൅ ݌௓ܼ௜௎ ൌ ݌௜௄ܭഥ௜ ൅ ݌௜௅ܮത௜,     (50) 
where the expenditure enters the left-hand side, while the budget is sourced by factor 
income appearing in the right-hand side of Equation (50). Note that we implicitly assume 
balanced trade so that there are no foreign savings. 
     The representative consumer in country ݅ chooses the consumption levels of ௜ܻ௎ 
and ܼ௜௎ to maximize her/his utility defined by Equation (49) subject to (50). The FOCs for 
the optimum are: 
 ߣ௜݌௜௒ ൌ ߚ௜ߜ௜ ൬௒೔ೆ௓೔ೆ ൰
ఉ೔ିଵ
,      (51) 
and  
 ߣ௜݌௓ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߚ௜ሻߜ௜ ൬௒೔ೆ௓೔ೆ ൰
ఉ೔
 ,     (52) 
where ߣ௜ is the Lagrange multiplier with respect to budget constraint (50). By Equations 
(51) and (52), the levels of ௜ܻ௎ and ܼ௜௎ are determined. 
 
2.4.2 Consumer in Country ࢝ 
 
The welfare level of the representative consumer in developing country ݓ is measured 
solely by the consumption level of the type-Z good because the type-Y good is sold only in 
developed countries: 
 ܷ௪ ൌ ܼ௪௎,       (53) 
where 
 ܷ௪ is the welfare level of the representative consumer in country ݓ; and 
 ܼ௪௎ is the consumption level of the type-Z good produced in the CRTS sector. 
Similarly to the previous case, the budget constraint equates expenditure with factor income 
as follows: 
 ݌௓ܼ௪௎ ൌ ݌௪௄ܭഥ௪ ൅ ݌௪௅ ܮത௪.      (54) 
Again, balanced trade is assumed. 
     The representative consumer in country ݓ chooses the consumption level of ܼ௪௎ to 




 ߣ௪݌௓ ൌ 1,       (55) 
where ߣ௪ is the Lagrange multiplier with respect to budget constraint (54). By Equation 
(55), the level of ܼ௪௎ is determined. 
 
2.5 Market Equilibrium 
 
The market-clearing conditions determine the price levels of the corresponding production 
factors and commodities in an equilibrium. 
 
2.5.1 Factor Market Clearing 
 
In each market country	݅, the following two labor market-clearing conditions hold in an 
equilibrium: 
 ܭഥ௜ ൌ ܭ௜௓ ൅ ܯ௜ேܭ௜ே ൅ ܯ௜ுܭ௜௜ு ൅ ∑ ൫ܯ௝ுܭ௝௜ு൯ሺ௜ஷ௝ሻ௝  
     ൅∑ ܯ௜௪ா ܭ௜௜ா௪ ൅ ∑ ܯ௜௪௏ ܭ௜௜௏௪ ,     (56) 
and 
 ܮത௜ ൌ ܮ௜௓ ൅ ܯ௜ேܮ௜ே ൅ ܯ௜ுሺܮ௜ு் ൅ ܮ௜௜ு௉ሻ ൅ ∑ ൫ܯ௝ுܮ௝௜ு௉൯ሺ௜ஷ௝ሻ௝  
     ൅∑ ܯ௜௪ா ሺܮ௜ா் ൅ ܮ௜௜ா௉ሻ௪ ൅ ∑ ܯ௜௪௏ ܮ௜௜௏௪ .    (57) 
Equations (56) and (57), respectively, determine the levels of factor prices ݌௜௄ and ݌௜௅. 
     In each developing country ݓ, the following two market-clearing conditions hold in 
an equilibrium: 
 ܭഥ௪ ൌ ܭ௪௓ ൅ ∑ ܯ௜௪ா ܭ௜௪ா௪ ൅ ∑ ܯ௜௪௏ ܭ௜௪௏௪ ,    (58) 
and 
 ܮത௪ ൌ ܮ௪௓ ൅ ∑ ܯ௜௪ா ܮ௜௪ா௉௪ ൅ ∑ ܯ௜௪௏ ܮ௜௪௏௪ .    (59) 
The price levels of skilled and unskilled labor in country ݓ, ݌௪௄ and ݌௪௅ , are determined 
by Equations (58) and (59). 
 
2.5.2 Commodity Market Clearing 
 
The demand and supply of the two types of commodity for final consumption are equated 




 ௜ܻ௎ ൌ ∑ ൫ܯ௝ே ௝ܻ௜ே ൅ ܯ௝ு ௝ܻ௜ு ൅ ∑ ܯ௝௪௏ ௝ܻ௜௪௏௪ ൯௝ ൅ ∑ ቄܯ௜௪ா ௜ܻா஽ ൅ ∑ ൫ܯ௝௪ா ௝ܻ௜௪ாி൯ሺ௜ஷ௝ሻ௝ ቅ௝ , 
         (60) 
and  
 ∑ ܼ௥௎௥ ൌ ∑ ܼ௥௥ .       (61) 
By Equations (60) and (61), the price levels of both type-Y and type-Z goods, ݌௜௒ and ݌௓, 
are determined. 
     Then, notice that one of the market-clearing conditions (56) through (61) 
automatically holds because of Walras’ Law. Therefore, we drop Equation (61) from the 
system, treating the type-Z good as the numéraire. In consequence, ݌௓ is set to unity given 
exogenously. 
 
2.6 System Equations/Inequalities 
 
In the model, the output volumes of the type-Y good in each of the four types of production 
pattern ( ௜ܻ௝ே, ௜ܻ௝ு, ௜ܻா஽, ௜ܻ௝௪ாி , and ௜ܻ௝௪௏ ), number of firms in the four types of production 
pattern (ܯ௜ே, ܯ௜ு, ܯ௜௪ா , and ܯ௜௪ா ), the output volume of the type-Z good (ܼ௥), the input 
volume of skilled and unskilled labor in the production of the type-Z good (ܭ௥௓ and ܮ௥௓), 
the Lagrange multiplier with respect to the representative consumer’s budget constraint in 
country ݅ (ߣ௜), the consumption levels of the two types of commodity by the representative 
consumer in country ݅  ( ௜ܻ௎  and ܼ௜௎ ), the Lagrange multiplier with respect to the 
representative consumer’s budget constraint in country ݓ (ߣ௪), the consumption/welfare 
level of the type-Z good by the representative consumer in country ݓ (ܼ௪௎), the price 
levels of skilled and unskilled labor in country ݅ (݌௜௄ and ݌௜௅), the price levels of the two 
types of labor in country ݓ (݌௪௄ and ݌௪௅ ), and the price level of the type-Y good (݌௜௒) are 
determined by Inequalities (33) through (37) and (42) through (45), and Equations (46) 
through (48), (50) through (52), (54), (55), (56) through (59), and (60), respectively. 
 
 
3. Numerical Implementation of the Model 
 
Markusen (2002) noted that one may face two types of computational difficulty in the 
numerical application of an analytical model such as the one we introduced in the previous 
section. One is due to the high-dimensionality of the model, and the other is brought by the 
handling of inequalities. Versions of the knowledge-capital model, an objective of which is 
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to analyze emerging patterns of independent firm-types under different economic 
conditions, require us to appropriately manage corner-solutions based on the 
Karush-Kuhn-Tucker condition. For this reason, the model used in this study was coded in 
the General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS) and solved by its PATH solver, which 
enables us to easily handle complementary slackness. 1 
     In experimental simulations, we change the relative factor endowments for either the 
developed- or developing-country groups, given absolute levels of total endowments for the 
group. The factor endowments for the group not being focused on are kept identical for the 
two countries in the group. Then, a box diagram à la Edgeworth box is drawn placing the 
total skilled labor endowment for the focused group on the vertical axis and the total 
unskilled labor endowment on the horizontal axis to capture the regime, welfare level, 
factor prices, and so on in each cell corresponding to the relative factor endowments of the 
two countries. 
     The model is calibrated to the center of the box diagram, where the two countries in 
each group are totally identical. At this point, it is assumed that only HMNEs are active due 
to the existence of high trade cost between the two market countries in the base case. Then, 
there are no local subsidiaries and plants in the developing countries, and no trade with 
respect to the type-Z good takes place. Calibration of the model requires a set of 
information that includes a social accounting matrix (SAM), which corresponds to the 
center of the box diagram, levels of fixed and trade costs, and input coefficients. Especially, 
careful setting of the firm-type/trade-link specific fixed cost ܨ  is required because 
simulation results tend to be sensitive to this setting, in addition to the fact that the firm 
types other than type-H do not enter the given SAM. 
 
3.1 Setting of the Firm-Type/Trade-Link Specific Fixed Cost ࡲ 
 
Let us recall the three important assumptions for the knowledge-capital model defined by 
Markusen (2002:129): 
 
Fragmentation: the location of knowledge based assets may be fragmented from 
production. Any incremental cost of supplying services of the asset to a single foreign plant 
versus the cost to a single domestic plant is small. 
 
                                                     
1 Brook, Kendrick, and Meeraus (1992) and Ferris and Munson (1998). 
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Skilled-labor Intensity: knowledge-based assets are skilled labor intensive relative to final 
production. 
 
Jointness: the services of knowledge based assets are (at least partially) joint (“public”) 
inputs into multiple production facilities. The added cost of a second plant is small 
compared to the cost of establishing a firm with local plant. 
 
The values of parameters such as fixed and trade costs should be set in line with these three 
properties, because a firm’s decisions to choose which operational type under a certain 
economic condition are crucially motivated by these properties. 
     Based on the three properties, we make the following four assumptions on the 
firm-type/trade-link specific fixed cost ܨ for a firm established in country ܣ: 
 2ܨ஺ே ൐ ܨ஺஺ு ൅ ܨ஺஻ு ൐ ܨ஺ே,      (62) 
 ܨ஺஺ா ൒ ܨ஺஺ு ൐ ܨ஺ே ൐ ܨ஺஺௏ ,      (63) 
 ܨ஺஻ு ൐ ܨ஺஼ா ൌ ܨ஺஽ா ൌ ܨ஺஼௏ ൌ ܨ஺஽௏ ,     (64) 
and 
 ܨ஺஺ு ൅ ܨ஺஻ு ൐ ܨ஺஺ா ൅ ܨ஺஼ா ൌ ܨ஺஺ா ൅ ܨ஺஽ா ൐ ܨ஺஺௏ ൅ ܨ஺஼௏ ൌ ܨ஺஺௏ ൅ ܨ஺஽௏ ൐ ܨ஺ே. 
         (65) 
The case for a firm established in country ܤ is the same. Relation (62) is based on the 
jointness assumption shown above. 
     Relation (63) is related to the headquarter cost. First, a type-H firm is costly 
compared to a type-N firm because additional skilled labor is required in the headquarters 
for managerial and coordination activities. Second, the additional cost of managerial and 
coordination activities for the operation of a local subsidiary might be higher in a 
developing country (type-E) than in a developed country (type-H). Third, a type-N firm is 
costly compared to a type-V firm because the latter may hire local skilled labor to train 
unskilled labor at a cheaper price in the host country. 
     Relation (64) is related to the local affiliate cost. In developing countries, cheaper 
skilled labor is available. 
     Relation (65) is related to the total cost. A type-V firm is less costly compared to the 
cases of type-H and type-E because it has only one assembly plant in a developing country 
so that the additional payment for managerial coordination activities is not required. Among 
the type-H and type-E firms, we assume that operating an assembly plant is more costly in 
a developed country than in a developing country. Relation (65) also implies that 
technology transfer incurs some amount of cost so that fragmentation is not perfect. 
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     Finally, the parameter values for the firm-type/trade-link specific fixed cost ܨ are 
set as follows: 
 ܨ௜ே ൌ 4.2; 
 ܨ௜௝ு ൌ 4.4	ሺ݅ ൌ ݆ሻ, 1.6	ሺ݅ ് ݆ሻ; 
 ܨ௜௥ா ൌ 4.4	ሺݎ ൌ ݅ሻ, 0	ሺݎ ് ݅ሻ, 1.5	ሺݎ ൌ ݓሻ; and 
 ܨ௜௥௏ ൌ 3.6	ሺݎ ൌ ݅ሻ, 0	ሺݎ ് ݅ሻ, 1.5	ሺݎ ൌ ݓሻ. 
These values tend to be set high to perform comparative statics between the base case and a 
counterfactual equilibrium where some of the values are set substantially lower. 
 
3.2 Calibration Based on a Social Accounting Matrix 
 
Along with the firm-type/trade-link specific fixed cost, trade costs related to the two types 
of commodity, intermediate and final goods, and input coefficients are assumed as follows: 
 ߬௜௥௑ ൌ ௝߬௥௒ ൌ 0.2; 
 ߠ௄ ൌ 1; 
 ߠ௅ ൌ 0.875; and 
 ߠ௑ ൌ 0.125. 
In addition, initial levels of prices are given as a usual cliché in the parameterization 
process of a general equilibrium model, in which not absolute but only relative levels of 
prices matter: 
 ݌௪௄ ൌ ݌௪௅ ൌ ݌௓ ൌ 1; and 
 ݌௜௒ ൌ 1.25. 
     Then, the initial values of some endogenous variables and a part of the country 
specific setup cost ܩ are calibrated from a SAM. In this study, we assume the following 
value is obtained from a SAM. 
 ߚ௝൫݌௝௄ܭഥ௝ ൅ ݌௝௅ܮത௝൯ ൌ 100. 
In the second step, the initial values of ௜ܻ௝ு is calculated using Equation (34): 
 ௜ܻ௝ு ൌ 16	ሺ݅ ൌ ݆ሻ, 14.4	ሺ݅ ് ݆ሻ. 
Third, ܯ௜ு is derived using the following relation: 
 ܯ௜ு ൌ ఉ೔൫௣೔಼ ௄ഥ೔ା௣೔
ಽ௅ത೔൯
∑ ௣೔ೊ௒ೕ೔ಹೕ
ൌ ଵ଴଴ଷ଼ . 
ߪ௜௝ு is also obtained by Equation (32): 
 ߪ௜௝ு ൌ 0.2	ሺ݅ ൌ ݆ሻ, 0.18	ሺ݅ ് ݆ሻ. 




 ܩ௝ ൌ 0.62. 
Based on this calibrated value, ܩ௪ is also set to 0.62 in the base case. 
     The whole picture of the SAM assumed in this study is shown in Table 1, where 
ܶܥ௜ு, ௥ܷ, ܯܴ௜௝ு, ܨܥ௜ு, ܫ௥, and ܧ௜ denote total cost, consumption, markup revenue, fixed 






Table 1: Social Accounting Matrix for the Center of the Box Diagram 
 
 
In this case, we presume that all of the four countries have the same amount of factor 
endowments. In the later simulation experiments, we will consider different country sizes 
for the developing group. 
     Using this SAM, the parameters in the two Cobb-Douglas aggregator functions (46) 





We now report on the results of simulations performed with the extended 
knowledge-capital model introduced previously. The simulations are categorized into two 
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groups. The first one is to reveal some of the behavioral characteristics of the model, and 
the second is to examine whether a free trade agreement (FTA) or an economic partnership 
agreement (EPA) would be effective for a developing country to stimulate incoming FDI, in 
a situation where the country is left behind another developing rival in forming a free-trade 
area with one of the developed countries where there is a market for the MNE’s final 
products. In the simulations, we change the relative factor endowments for either the 
developed- or developing-country groups given absolute levels of total endowments for the 
group, and we calculate every equilibrium of the economy under the selected sets of 
national endowments. The factor endowments for the group not under focus are kept 
identical to two the members in the group. Then, trade and fixed costs are respectively 
reduced from their initial values set in the base case to see how the pattern of regimes 
changes. 
 





Figure 2: Equilibrium Regime in the Base Case (Developed Countries) 
 
 
Figure 2 is a box diagram for the case when relative factor endowments for the developed 
(market) countries are changed given the absolute levels of total endowments shown in the 
benchmark SAM (Table 1). This will be the base case for comparison with the results 
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obtained when a set of parameters or exogenous variables are changed. The initial levels of 
trade and fixed costs assumed in the base case are: 
 ߬௜௥௑ ൌ ௝߬௥௒ ൌ 0.2; 
 ܨ௜ே ൌ 4.2; 
 ܨ௜௝ு ൌ 4.4	ሺ݅ ൌ ݆ሻ, 1.6	ሺ݅ ് ݆ሻ; 
 ܨ௜௥ா ൌ 4.4	ሺݎ ൌ ݅ሻ, 0	ሺݎ ് ݅ሻ, 1.5	ሺݎ ൌ ݓሻ; 
 ܨ௜௥௏ ൌ 3.6	ሺݎ ൌ ݅ሻ, 0	ሺݎ ് ݅ሻ, 1.5	ሺݎ ൌ ݓሻ; and 
 ܩ௥ ൌ 0.62. 
     In the box, the vertical axis corresponds to the total endowment of skilled labor for 
the two developed countries, and the horizontal axis to that of unskilled labor. The division 
of the factor endowments between the two countries is shown with country ܣ measured 
from the southwest (SW) corner and country ܤ measured from the northeast (NE) corner. 
The model is repeatedly solved for each cell 361 (19ൈ19) times, altering the distribution of 
factor endowments. Each cell represents an equilibrium regime and the number inside 
shows which type of firm is active in the regime. The regime number is defined as: 
 ߗ ൌ ߱஺ே ൅ ߱஻ே ൅ ߱஺ு ൅ ߱஻ு ൅ ߱஺஼ா ൅ ߱஺஽ா ൅ ߱஻஼ா ൅ ߱஻஽ா  
     ൅߱஺஼௏ ൅ ߱஺஽௏ ൅ ߱஻஼௏ ൅ ߱஻஽௏ , 
where 
 ߱஺ே ൌ 1000 if Type-N firms established in country ܣ are active, otherwise 0; 
 ߱஻ே ൌ 100 if Type-N firms established in country ܤ are active, otherwise 0; 
 ߱஺ு ൌ 10 if Type-H firms established in country ܣ are active, otherwise 0; 
 ߱஻ு ൌ 1 if Type-H firms established in country ܤ are active, otherwise 0; 
 ߱஺஼ா ൌ 0.1 if Type-E firms established in country ܣ operating in country ܥ 
    are active, otherwise 0; 
 ߱஺஽ா ൌ 0.2 if Type-E firms established in country ܣ operating in country ܦ 
    are active, otherwise 0; 
 ߱஻஼ா ൌ 0.01 if Type-E firms established in country ܤ operating in country ܥ 
    are active, otherwise 0; 
 ߱஻஽ா ൌ 0.02 if Type-E firms established in country ܤ operating in country ܦ 
    are active, otherwise 0; 
 ߱஺஼௏ ൌ 0.001 if Type-V firms established in country ܣ operating in country ܥ 
    are active, otherwise 0; 
 ߱஺஽௏ ൌ 0.002 if Type-V firms established in country ܣ operating in country ܦ 
    are active, otherwise 0; 
 ߱஻஼௏ ൌ 0.0001 if Type-V firms established in country ܤ operating in country ܥ 
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    are active, otherwise 0; and  
 ߱஻஽௏ ൌ 0.0002 if Type-V firms established in country ܤ operating in country ܦ 
    are active, otherwise 0. 
     Figure 2 shows that only type-H firms are active around the center of the box 
diagram, where two developed countries are similar in both size and relative endowment. If 
the countries are different in size while being similar in relative endowment, type-N firms 
established in the country with abundant factors dominate the production and occupy both 
markets, as confirmed around the SW and NE corners. When the price of unskilled labor in 
a market country becomes cheaper, foreign type-H firms become active in the country, as 
confirmed in the northwest (NW) and southeast (SE) neighborhoods surrounding the 
central area. Toward the NW corner from the center, the price of skilled/unskilled labor in 
country ܣ becomes lower/higher while that in country ܤ goes opposite. Toward the SE 
corner, it reverses. Thus, firms in a market country where the price of unskilled labor 
becomes extremely high, go out to developing countries as type-V firms, as confirmed 





Figure 3: Equilibrium Regime in the Base Case (Developing Countries) 
 
 
     Figure 3 is a box diagram for the case when relative factor endowments for the 
developing countries are changed and absolute levels of total endowments for the group are 
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given. This is also the base case. Figure 3 shows that around the center and the SW and NE 
corners, where developing countries are similar in relative endowment, MNEs never setup 
plants in developing countries but go straight to the market countries as type-H firms. This 
occurs because there is no substantial difference between relative factor prices among the 
countries. On the other hand, around the NW and SE corners where cheaper skilled labor is 
available in either of the developing countries, type-V firms become active. For instance, 
around the SE corner, skilled labor is relatively abundant in country ܥ so that type-V firms 
from both countries ܣ and ܤ operate in ܥ. Around the NW corner, firms operating in 
country ܦ prevail. Note that, in this base case captured by Figures 2 and 3, type-E firms 





Figure 4: Lower Trade Cost of Components (߬௜௥௑ ൌ 0.04, Developed Countries) 
 
 
     Next, let us see what happens when selected values of trade and fixed costs change. 
When the trade cost of components concerning all trade-links is lowered, type-H firms 
extend their influence (Figure 4). It is quite natural that sending components to foreign 
countries becomes cheaper in this case. As the type-H firms increase, the incentive to 
operate in developing countries as a type-V firm becomes weak. 
     When the trade cost of finished products concerning all trade-links is lowered, 
type-N firms increase (Figure 5). This is also natural in that exporting finished products to 
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foreign countries becomes cheaper in this case. The type-N firms extend their influence 
along the SW-NE diagonals where the relative endowment of countries and factor prices 
tend to be similar. On the other hand, if there is a difference in factor availability even to a 
slight extent, the firms established in the larger country dominate the production and 
occupy both markets, as in the previous case. The incentive to operate in developing 





Figure 5: Lower Trade Cost of Finished Products (߬௜௥௒ ൌ 0.04, Developed Countries) 
 
 
     If the change in trade cost of finished products is limited to only the trade-link 
between countries ܣ and ܥ, type-V firms established in ܣ increases in ܥ, as confirmed 
around the NW corner in Figure 6, where the price of unskilled labor in country ܣ is high. 
Although type-V firms in country ܣ operate in both developing countries ܥ  and ܦ 
around this area in the base case, all of the type-V firms change their operational location to 
ܥ in this case. Therefore, it can be said that liberalizing imports of finished products from a 
developing country motivates firms in the liberalizing country to set up local affiliates in 
the objective country. 
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0.60 10.0030 10.0000 10.0000 10.0000 110.0000 110.0000 110.0000 110.0000 110.0000 1110.0000 1100.0000 1000.0000 1001.0000 1001.0000 1001.0000 1001.0000 1001.0000 1001.0000 1001.0000 0.40
0.55 10.0030 10.0000 10.0000 110.0000 110.0000 110.0000 110.0000 110.0000 110.0000 1110.0000 1000.0000 1001.0000 1001.0000 1001.0000 1001.0000 1001.0000 1001.0000 1001.0000 1001.0000 0.45
0.50 110.0000 110.0000 110.0000 110.0000 110.0000 110.0000 110.0000 110.0000 110.0000 100.0000 1001.0000 1001.0000 1001.0000 1001.0000 1001.0000 1001.0000 1001.0000 1001.0000 1001.0000 0.50
0.45 110.0000 110.0000 110.0000 110.0000 110.0000 110.0000 110.0000 110.0000 100.0000 1101.0000 1001.0000 1001.0000 1001.0000 1001.0000 1001.0000 1001.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0002 0.55
0.40 110.0000 110.0000 110.0000 110.0000 110.0000 110.0000 110.0000 100.0000 1100.0000 1101.0000 1001.0000 1001.0000 1001.0000 1001.0000 1001.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0003 0.60
0.35 1110.0000 110.0000 110.0000 110.0000 110.0000 100.0000 100.0000 100.0000 1101.0000 1101.0000 1001.0000 1001.0000 1001.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0003 0.65
0.30 110.0000 110.0000 110.0000 110.0000 100.0000 100.0000 100.0000 1101.0000 1101.0000 1101.0000 1101.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 101.0000 1.0003 0.70
0.25 110.0000 110.0000 110.0000 100.0000 100.0000 100.0000 1100.0000 1101.0000 1101.0000 101.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0003 1.0003 0.75
0.20 110.0000 110.0000 100.0000 100.0000 100.0000 100.0000 101.0000 101.0000 101.0000 101.0000 101.0000 101.0000 101.0000 101.0000 101.0000 1.0003 1.0003 1.0003 1.0003 0.80
0.15 110.0000 110.0000 100.0000 100.0000 100.0000 101.0000 101.0000 101.0000 101.0000 101.0000 101.0000 101.0000 101.0000 101.0000 101.0000 1.0003 1.0003 1.0003 1.0001 0.85
0.10 110.0000 100.0000 100.0000 100.0000 100.0000 101.0000 101.0000 101.0000 101.0000 101.0000 101.0000 101.0000 101.0000 101.0000 101.0003 1.0003 1.0003 1.0003 1.0001 0.90
0.05 100.0000 100.0000 100.0000 100.0000 100.0000 101.0000 101.0000 101.0000 101.0000 101.0000 101.0000 101.0000 101.0000 101.0003 101.0003 1.0003 1.0003 1.0003 1.0003 0.95
0.00 (A) 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95



































Figure 7: Lower Trade Cost of Finished Products (߬஺஼௒ ൌ 0.04, Developing Countries) 
 
 
     When two developing countries differ in size and relative factor endowment, 
lowering the trade cost of finished products concerning the trade-link just between 
countries ܣ and ܥ motivates firms in country ܤ to be type-E and operate in country ܥ. 
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0.90 10.0010 10.0010 10.0010 10.0010 10.0010 10.0010 10.0010 10.0010 1010.0010 1010.0010 1010.0010 1010.0000 1010.0000 1010.0000 1010.0000 1010.0000 1000.0000 1000.0000 1001.0000 0.10
0.85 10.0010 10.0010 10.0010 10.0010 10.0010 10.0010 10.0010 10.0010 1010.0010 1010.0010 1010.0000 1010.0000 1010.0000 1010.0000 1010.0000 1010.0000 1000.0000 1001.0000 1001.0000 0.15
0.80 10.0010 10.0010 10.0010 10.0010 10.0010 10.0010 10.0010 10.0010 1010.0010 1010.0000 1010.0000 1010.0000 1010.0000 1010.0000 1010.0000 1000.0000 1001.0000 1001.0000 1001.0000 0.20
0.75 10.0010 10.0010 10.0010 10.0010 10.0010 10.0010 10.0010 10.0000 10.0000 10.0000 10.0000 10.0000 1010.0000 1011.0000 1011.0000 1001.0000 1001.0000 1001.0000 1101.0000 0.25
0.70 10.0010 10.0010 10.0010 10.0010 10.0010 10.0000 10.0000 10.0000 10.0000 10.0000 10.0000 11.0000 1011.0000 1011.0000 1011.0000 1001.0000 1001.0000 1001.0000 1001.0000 0.30
0.65 10.0010 10.0010 10.0010 10.0000 10.0000 10.0000 10.0000 10.0000 10.0000 11.0000 11.0000 11.0000 1011.0000 1011.0000 1001.0000 1001.0000 1001.0000 1001.0000 1001.0000 0.35
0.60 10.0010 10.0000 10.0000 10.0000 10.0000 10.0000 110.0000 11.0000 11.0000 11.0000 11.0000 11.0000 1011.0000 1011.0000 1001.0000 1001.0000 1001.0000 1001.0000 1001.0000 0.40
0.55 10.0010 10.0000 10.0000 10.0000 110.0000 110.0000 111.0000 11.0000 11.0000 11.0000 11.0000 11.0000 1011.0000 1011.0000 1001.0000 1001.0000 1001.0000 1001.0000 1001.0001 0.45
0.50 110.0010 10.0000 110.0000 110.0000 110.0000 110.0000 111.0000 11.0000 11.0000 11.0000 11.0000 11.0000 1011.0000 1001.0000 1001.0000 1001.0000 1001.0000 1.0000 1001.0001 0.50
0.45 110.0000 110.0000 110.0000 110.0000 110.0000 111.0000 111.0000 11.0000 11.0000 11.0000 11.0000 11.0000 1011.0000 1001.0000 1001.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0001 0.55
0.40 110.0000 110.0000 110.0000 110.0000 110.0000 111.0000 111.0000 11.0000 11.0000 11.0000 11.0000 11.0000 1001.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0001 0.60
0.35 110.0000 110.0000 110.0000 110.0000 110.0000 111.0000 111.0000 11.0000 11.0000 11.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0001 0.65
0.30 110.0000 110.0000 110.0000 110.0000 111.0000 111.0000 111.0000 11.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0001 1.0001 0.70
0.25 1110.0000 110.0000 110.0000 110.0000 111.0000 111.0000 101.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0003 1.0002 0.75
0.20 110.0000 110.0000 110.0000 100.0000 101.0000 101.0000 101.0000 101.0000 101.0000 101.0000 101.0000 101.0000 101.0000 101.0000 101.0000 1.0003 1.0003 1.0003 1.0003 0.80
0.15 110.0000 110.0000 100.0000 101.0000 101.0000 101.0000 101.0000 101.0000 101.0000 101.0000 101.0000 101.0000 101.0000 101.0000 101.0000 1.0003 1.0003 1.0003 1.0002 0.85
0.10 110.0000 100.0000 100.0000 101.0000 101.0000 101.0000 101.0000 101.0000 101.0000 101.0000 101.0000 101.0000 101.0000 101.0000 101.0003 1.0003 1.0003 1.0003 1.0002 0.90
0.05 100.0000 100.0000 100.0000 101.0000 101.0000 101.0000 101.0000 101.0000 101.0000 101.0000 101.0000 101.0000 101.0000 101.0001 101.0003 1.0003 1.0003 1.0003 1.0001 0.95
0.00 (A) 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95
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0.15 11.0000 11.0000 11.0000 11.0100 11.0100 10.0100 10.0110 10.0110 10.0110 0.0110 0.0110 0.0111 0.0111 0.0111 0.0111 0.0011 0.0011 0.0011 0.0011 0.85
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This phenomenon is obvious around the SE part in Figure 7, where the price of unskilled 
labor in country ܥ is relatively cheap. This result is consistent with the one obtained by 
Ekholm, Forslid, and Markusen (2007). Thus, type-E firms tend to arise in the low-cost 
countries in a free-trade area to serve the market in the FTA member. 
     Finally, no substantial difference can be observed with respect to other items, such as 
the country specific fixed cost ܩ or the firm-type/trade-link specific cost ܨ, from the base 
case patterns in either case when relative factor endowments for the developed and 
developing countries respectively are changed. The effects of independently controlling 
fixed costs on the type of active firms seem not to be large compared to those of trade cost 
in the present setting. 
 
4.2 Experiments: Is FTA/EPA Effective for a Developing Country to 
Attract FDI? 
 
Let us proceed to more scenario-oriented simulations. With these experiments, we examine 
the effects of liberalizing trade between a pair of developed (market) and developing 
countries and of implementing cost-saving policies, such as standardizing rules or 
simplifying procedures related to opening business in the member countries, assuming the 
situation that the developing country in question is left behind of another rival in settling an 
economic partnership. Suppose that the country is in need of FDI to accelerate economic 
growth to catch up with rival countries. 
     To simulate trade liberalization between a pair of developed and developing countries, 
both ߬௜௪௑  and ௝߬௪௒  are set to 0.05 (25% of the initial level). Let us call this case “FTA”. 
The additional cost-saving policy is expressed by lowering both ܨ௜௪ா  and ܨ௜௪௏  by half 
(0.7). We call the set of FTA plus this additional policy “EPA”. The initial levels of trade 
and fixed costs before any country settles free trade are set to: 
 ߬௜௥௑ ൌ ௝߬௥௒ ൌ 0.2; 
 ܨ௜ே ൌ 4.2; 
 ܨ௜௝ு ൌ 4.4	ሺ݅ ൌ ݆ሻ, 1.6	ሺ݅ ് ݆ሻ; 
 ܨ௜௥ா ൌ 4.4	ሺݎ ൌ ݅ሻ, 0	ሺݎ ് ݅ሻ, 1.4	ሺݎ ൌ ݓሻ; 
 ܨ௜௥௏ ൌ 3.6	ሺݎ ൌ ݅ሻ, 0	ሺݎ ് ݅ሻ, 1.4	ሺݎ ൌ ݓሻ; and 
 ܩ௥ ൌ 0.62	ሺݎ ൌ ݅ሻ, 0.31	ሺݎ ൌ ݓሻ	. 
Notice that the levels of ܨ௜௪ா , ܨ௜௪௏ , and ܩ௪ are set slightly lower than in the previous 
simulations to consider lower factor costs in developing countries. It can also be supposed 
that the developing countries have already started implementing cost-saving policies such 
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as construction of special economic zones and industrial parks. 
 
4.2.1 Basic Environment 
 
Onto the setting we observed previously, we introduce the situation that FTA between 
countries ܣ  and ܥ  has already been implemented. This is expressed by setting 
߬஺஼௑ ൌ ߬஺஼௒ ൌ 0.05. Figure 8 is a box diagram for the economic environment before country 
ܦ concludes FTA with any market country. The regime pattern closely resembles the one 
captured in Figure 7 (߬஺஼௒ ൌ 0.04). In the SE area, where the price of unskilled labor is 
relatively low, type-V firms from both developed countries ܣ and ܤ, and type-E firms 
from country ܤ operates in country ܥ. As the central part of the box is approached, it 
implies that the relative price of skilled to unskilled labor falls, and firms established in 





Figure 8: FTA between Countries ܣ and ܥ (Developing Countries) 
 
 
     Note that the size of the area at the SE corner, where only type-V firms are active, 
shrinks as the absolute level of total endowments for the developing countries become 
smaller. As we test different sizes of developing countries from double to half the size of the 
developed countries, the impact on factor prices of one unit of foreign firm entrance 
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0.75 11.0022 11.0022 11.0022 11.0022 11.0022 11.0022 11.0022 11.0000 11.0000 11.0000 11.0000 11.0000 11.0000 11.0000 11.0000 11.0000 11.0000 11.0000 11.0100 0.25
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0.55 11.0000 11.0000 11.0000 11.0000 11.0000 11.0000 11.0000 11.0000 11.0000 11.0000 11.0000 11.0000 11.0000 11.0100 11.0100 10.0100 10.0100 10.0100 10.0100 0.45
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becomes large for a small-sized country. 
 





Figure 9: FTA with Countries ܦ (Developing Countries) 
 
 
Suppose country ܦ liberalizes trade with one of the market countries. When country ܣ is 
selected, it is expressed by setting ߬஺஽௑ ൌ ߬஺஽௒ ൌ 0.05. Figure 9 shows the regime pattern 
when both countries ܥ and ܦ have liberalized trade with country ܣ. It is clear that the 
perfectly identical pattern appears in the opposite corner leaving the pattern around the SE 
corner completely unaffected. In this case, a group of type-H firms established in country 
ܤ turn into type-E firms and start operating in country ܦ to serve the market in country ܣ. 
The participation of country ܦ in the partnership with country ܣ will not affect the 
welfare level or factor prices in country ܥ. Furthermore, county ܦ’s choice of FTA partner 
will not affect the regime pattern, as well as welfare levels and factor prices in both 
developing countries ܥ and ܦ, in the present setting wherein the two developed countries 
are perfectly symmetric. The difference can be found in the nationality of the firms 
operating in country ܦ, and in welfare levels in the market countries. If country ܦ’s FTA 
partner is changed to country ܤ, type-E firms from country ܤ are replaced by those from 
country ܣ. In consequence, type-E firms from country ܣ and type-V firms from country 
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ܤ start operating in country ܦ. The welfare level in the country that settles FTA with 
country ܦ improves, while the country that has not been chosen as the FTA partner is 
worse off. 
     Another important point is that MNEs will not operate in developing countries even 
though FTAs take place if their relative factor endowments are similar. To attract inward 
FDI, a developing country must have substantially cheap unskilled labor based on the rich 
relative endowment of the factor. 
     Next, let us consider the case that country ܦ settle an economic partnership program 
in which a cost-saving policy related to firm-type/trade-link specific fixed cost is added to a 
regular FTA with one of the developed countries. It is expressed by setting ܨ௜஽ா ൌ ܨ௜஽௏ ൌ
0.7. Again, country ܦ’s choice of FTA partner does not matter apart from the welfare 
levels of the developed countries. Hence, either country ܣ or ܤ, whichever is selected as 
the FTA partner, is applied to the suffix ݅ in ܨ௜஽ா  and ܨ௜஽௏ . Note that the FTA between 
countries ܣ and ܥ does not include this additional option. The purpose is to see whether 





Figure 10: EPA with Country ܦ (Developing Countries) 
 
 
     Figure 10 shows the regime pattern when country ܣ simultaneously establishes FTA 
with country ܥ  and EPA with country ܦ . As expected, type-H firms slightly lose 
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influence being replaced by type-E and type-V firms in the NW area. On the other hand, the 
border between the pure horizontal area and the area in which type-H and type-E firms 
coexist does not move from the previous case. The requirement given a substantial 
difference in relative factor endowments to have assembly plants in a developing country 
seems to be strong. 
 




Table 2: Effects of Implementing FTA with Country ܦ 
 
 
Let us turn to verifying whether FTA/EPA brings benefits to country ܦ. For this task, we 
examine welfare levels as well as factor prices as the source of income. In the present 
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model, which does not consider any spillover effects from inward FDI that may help to 
enhance long-run growth rates, the advantage of having an assembly plant is just in the fact 
that it may increase income through affecting factor prices by extra demand for skilled and 
unskilled labor. Therefore, factor prices play an important role as the source of welfare 
gains. In the meantime, the implementation of FTA by country ܦ never affects the welfare 
level or factor prices in country ܥ, as mentioned before. 
     Table 2 shows the effects of implementing FTA between country ܦ and one of the 
market countries on welfare and factor prices. All values are in terms of percentage change 
with respect to the level of the corresponding item at the base case, which is captured by the 
benchmark SAM (Table 1). Hence, every value at the center of the box diagram becomes 
zero because we calibrated the model at the center of the diagram. 
     Notice that the FTA brings negative effects on welfare in the neighboring cells 
around the NW corner (table on the top). This is the result of changes in price of the two 
factors. As the table in the middle shows, the price of skilled labor changes its sign from 
positive to negative if we trace the values from the NW corner to the center. In contrast, the 
price of unskilled labor changes its signs from negative to positive (table at the bottom). 
The cells that show negative welfare impact correspond to the points where the total 
income from both skilled and unskilled labor is lower than the base case. When the total 
endowments for the developing countries are smaller, the possibility of facing welfare 
losses is lower. On the other hand, the possibility grows as the total endowments become 
larger. This is because the rate of change of factor prices per unit increase of assembly plant 
becomes large in a small-sized country. Another way to avoid welfare losses is to increase 
the availability of skilled labor in the country. Investing to educate nations and other efforts 
to accumulate human capital may help. 
     Next, Table 3 shows the effects of implementation of cost-saving policies in addition 
to FTA between country ܦ and one of the market countries. The supplement may enhance 
welfare gains from the FTA except the case when country ܦ is extremely lacking in 
skilled labor. This is because lowering the firm-type/trade-link specific fixed cost saves 
skilled labor input, so that the factor turns out to be redundant and the impact on its price 
becomes relatively large in a country where skilled labor is scarce. This also happens in the 
case when the total endowments for the developing countries are smaller. Efforts to 







Table 3: Effects of Additional Implementation of Cost-Saving Policies 
 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
To prepare an answer to the question of how a developing country can attract FDI, this 
paper explored the factors and policies that may help bring FDI into a developing country, 
utilizing an extended version of the knowledge-capital model that includes four types of 
firms and four countries grouped into developed (market) and developing ones in a general 
equilibrium framework. Simulations with the model revealed conditions for which each 
type of firm would be active in a given economic environment. With a special focus on the 
effects of FTAs/EPAs between market countries and developing countries, the key findings 
can be summarized as follows. 
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0.65 0.406 0.396 0.383 0.498 0.400 0.310 0.227 0.089 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.35
0.60 0.340 0.440 0.407 0.323 0.246 0.157 0.021 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.40
0.55 0.411 0.333 0.261 0.195 0.081 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.45
0.50 0.274 0.211 0.131 0.029 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.50
0.45 0.171 0.074 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.55
0.40 0.034 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.60
0.35 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.65
0.30 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.70
0.25 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.75
0.20 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.80
0.15 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.85
0.10 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.90
0.05 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.95
0.00 (C) 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95
0.95 0.90 0.85 0.80 0.75 0.70 0.65 0.60 0.55 0.50 0.45 0.40 0.35 0.30 0.25 0.20 0.15 0.10 0.05 0.00 (D)
0.95 -524.406 -518.390 -511.975 -504.902 -496.631 -485.928 -538.311 -600.992 -615.927 -540.684 -317.707 -119.061 -111.824 -131.477 -105.885 -91.755 -6.003 0.000 0.000 0.05
0.90 -95.448 -90.162 -84.251 -77.580 -69.990 -61.319 -33.436 -10.350 -10.461 -13.688 -30.238 -22.625 -13.030 -11.746 -10.378 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.10
0.85 -38.999 -36.382 -33.566 -23.518 -9.525 -9.601 -9.678 -18.487 -19.967 -16.558 -12.414 -11.286 -10.106 -4.636 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.15
0.80 -19.235 -8.827 -8.880 -8.932 -11.038 -16.923 -14.982 -13.054 -11.859 -10.856 -9.820 -8.737 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.20
0.75 -8.301 -8.335 -13.610 -13.237 -12.009 -10.771 -9.707 -10.455 -9.534 -8.584 -3.951 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.25
0.70 -11.710 -10.877 -10.028 -9.167 -8.296 -10.081 -9.255 -8.410 -7.319 -0.146 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.30
0.65 -8.611 -7.977 -7.334 -9.731 -8.984 -8.225 -7.449 -3.470 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.35
0.60 -6.567 -8.475 -8.725 -8.037 -7.339 -5.722 -0.867 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.40
0.55 -8.476 -7.849 -7.216 -6.573 -3.102 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.45
0.50 -7.086 -6.501 -4.727 -1.192 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.50
0.45 -5.878 -2.808 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.55
0.40 -1.339 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.60
0.35 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.65
0.30 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.70
0.25 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.75
0.20 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.80
0.15 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.85
0.10 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.90
0.05 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.95
0.00 (C) 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95
0.95 0.90 0.85 0.80 0.75 0.70 0.65 0.60 0.55 0.50 0.45 0.40 0.35 0.30 0.25 0.20 0.15 0.10 0.05 0.00 (D)
0.95 5.781 6.235 6.797 7.512 8.454 9.749 9.767 9.747 10.808 8.293 5.321 2.382 4.104 5.778 4.525 4.311 1.212 0.000 0.000 0.05
0.90 3.830 4.036 4.264 4.515 4.782 5.053 3.260 1.107 1.155 1.578 3.876 3.527 2.263 2.139 1.993 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.10
0.85 2.766 2.872 2.985 2.340 1.013 1.050 1.091 2.213 2.676 2.551 2.131 2.022 1.897 0.935 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.15
0.80 1.927 0.933 0.964 0.996 1.275 2.099 2.055 1.996 2.016 1.918 1.810 1.686 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.20
0.75 0.918 0.946 1.615 1.695 1.671 1.639 1.625 1.826 1.730 1.624 0.795 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.25
0.70 1.433 1.424 1.410 1.390 1.363 1.743 1.658 1.564 1.419 0.031 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.30
0.65 1.219 1.206 1.189 1.668 1.591 1.508 1.417 0.697 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.35
0.60 1.053 1.436 1.530 1.455 1.375 1.116 0.179 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.40
0.55 1.473 1.406 1.334 1.256 0.623 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.45
0.50 1.294 1.225 0.925 0.245 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.50
0.45 1.127 0.563 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.55
0.40 0.274 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.60
0.35 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.65
0.30 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.70
0.25 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.75
0.20 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.80
0.15 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.85
0.10 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.90
0.05 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.95
0.00 (C) 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95
Endowment of Unskilled Labor (Developing Economies)
Endowment of Unskilled Labor (Developing Economies)


















































































1. When two developing countries differ in size and relative factor endowment, 
lowering the trade cost of finished products concerning a trade-link between a 
market country and a developing country motivates firms in a country “not” on the 
link to be an export-platform MNE operating in the developing country on the link. 
 
2. MNEs will not setup plants in developing countries if their relative factor 
endowments are similar even when FTA takes place between some of those 
countries and a country where there is a market for the commodity produced by the 
MNE. To attract inward FDI, a developing country must have substantially cheap 
unskilled labor based on a rich relative endowment of this factor. 
 
3. In the present setting wherein two market countries are perfectly symmetric, a 
developing country’s choice of FTA partner from among the market countries will 
not affect the production pattern of firms, welfare levels, or factor prices in the 
developing countries. On the other hand, the welfare level in the market country 
that settles the FTA with a developing country improves, while the market country 
that has not been chosen as the FTA partner is worse off. 
 
4. Although FTA/EPA generally tends to increase FDI to a developing country, the 
possibility to improve welfare through increased demand for skilled and unskilled 
labor becomes higher as the size of the country declines. This is because the rate of 
change of factor prices per unit assembly plant increase becomes large in a 
small-sized country. 
 
5. As the size of a developing country grows, the possibility of facing welfare losses 
through FTA/EPA becomes higher. To avoid this problem, policies to increase the 
availability of skilled labor in the country, such as investing in education, may help. 
 
6. Because the additional implementation of cost-saving policies to reduce 
firm-type/trade-link specific fixed costs tends to depreciate the price of skilled labor 
by saving its input, a developing country, in which skilled labor is extremely scarce, 
is better off avoiding the additional option because the negative impact on the 
skilled labor price is relatively large. If the country chooses to pursue larger welfare 




     There are several potentially important issues that we have not yet taken into account 
in our analytical framework. First, the present model does not consider any spillover effects 
from inward FDI that may contribute to enhance long-run growth rates. Inclusion of such 
positive effects possibly brought by FDI will change some of the results listed above (#4 
and #5). Second, the production of components in foreign market countries and in 
developing countries is obvious in the real economy. Although such a model must be highly 
complicated, it is worth challenging. Finally, the model does not include a firm-type called 
“complex integration” proposed by Yeaple (2003) and studied by Grossman, Helpman, and 
Szeidl (2006), which is a combination of the type-H firm serving for the foreign market and 
the type-V firm for the home market. The next version of our model will definitely come 
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